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Abstract
This paper presents an approach to shellcode recognition
directly from network traffic data using a multi-layer per-
ceptron with back-propagation learning algorithm. Using
raw network data composed of a mixture of shellcode, im-
age files, and DLL-Dynamic Link Library files, our pro-
posed design was able to classify the three types of data
with high accuracy and high precision with neither false
positives nor false negatives. The proposed method com-
prises simple and fast pre-processing of raw data of a fixed
length for each network data package and yields perfect
results with 100% accuracy for the three data types con-
sidered. The research is significant in the context of net-
work security and intrusion detection systems. Work is
under way for real time recognition and fine-tuning the
differentiation between various shellcodes.
1 Introduction
Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) monitor,
identify and alert to the presence of network traffic
indicative of malicious or poor practices i.e, unethi-
cal hacking or system misconfiguration. The increas-
ing popularity of cloud computing combined with the
limitations of traditional host based protection systems
have added to the popularity of NIDS implementation
[Day and Zhao, 2011]. The most common method of
NIDS operation is signature based, in which packets
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are examined for patterns which are associated with, or
known to be hazardous. An important example of what
constitutes hazardous is that of malicious shellcode. Ma-
licious shellcode is a program written for the purposes
of opening a shell on a victims machine and allowing a
hacker unauthorised command line access. Due to the
ability to further leverage such a breach, their successful
execution is one of the principal objectives of a hacker,
and they are frequently used as the payload for exploita-
tions using system penetration tools such as Metasploit
[Zhao and Ahn, 2013]. They are usually executed as a
result of exploiting stack or heap-based buffer overflow
vulnerabilities in system services which subvert the legiti-
mate flow of code execution to that of the shellcode. Iden-
tifying shellcode as malicious traffic is particularly chal-
lenging with signature based NIDS due to false positives
as shellcode patterns are often indistinguishable to that of
some forms of benign traffic. For example, while work-
ing as a network security consultant for the Shop Direct
Group (UK) using the network intrusion detection tools
Sguil and Snort from the Debian based Linux distribution
Security Onion, it was noticed that signatures designed to
match shellcode frequently also matched other non shell-
code binaries as well as jpg image files. The frequency
of these false positives was such that the signatures them-
selves ultimately had to be disabled, rendering them use-
less. This experience with the false positive problem with
shellcode and signature based systems is very common,
Microsoft discuss this at length in their patent of methods
to detect malicious shellcode with reduced false positives
in memory [Shin et al., 2013].
The research discussed in this paper explores a new
mechanism to reduce false positives and negatives during
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detection of malicious shellcode using Artificial Neural
Networks (ANNs). ANNs, biologically inspired by the
human brain, are used as modelling mechanism for solv-
ing non-linear problems. As there has been significant
established successes in using ANNs for pattern recogni-
tion e.g. image and speech, it could be argued that the po-
tential to solve the false positive problem when detecting
shellcode would be high. As such this paper will discuss
our use of an artificial neural network using a supervised
feedforward network with back propagation algorithm, to
accurately identify shellcode traffic within custom gener-
ated traffic samples.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2 we discuss, compare and critique both tradi-
tional and statistical approaches to network intrusion de-
tection. Section 3 outlines the methodology and how sam-
ples were generated for testing. In Section 4 we describe
the design and implementation of the ANN solution with
simulation results. Finally in Section 5, we critically eval-
uate the results obtained with conclusions and recommen-
dations for future work.
2 Previous Work
2.1 Comparison of signature and anomaly
based NIDS
Mainstream NIDS can be categorised as either signature
based or anomaly based. Signature based look for patterns
in packets which are indicative of an attack. Whereas
anomaly based NIDS look for a deviation away from a
perceived normal baseline which has been generated over
a period of time. Signature based systems can be seen
to have two key issues, firstly they are often ineffective
against unknown (zero day) attacks. This is due to these
attack patterns being unknown and thus not being used for
comparison. Secondly, it relies on a human interpretation
of the root cause of the attack, sometimes this is erroneous
if the context of the attack is not considered when creating
the pattern matching rules. In these instances it takes only
a small deviation in attack method to cause a false nega-
tive. Conversely anomaly based NIDS are not associated
as strongly with these limitations and have been shown to
be more effective against zero day attacks. However there
are issues concerning the behavioural model generated, in
the training phase, system performance and with the need
for administrator intervention.
2.2 Traditional statistical methods
Decades of research in intrusion detection for computer
system security revealed numerous possible approaches
to the problem. This was initiated by the introduction of
the concept that certain types of threats to the security of
computer systems could be identified through the exami-
nation of information contained in the computer systems
audit trail as seen in the work of [Anderson, 1980]. Three
treats were identified as: external penetrations; internal
penetrations; and misfeasors. It was later suggested that
possible stealthy users could be detected by monitoring
the functions that turn off the audit systems, or through
a comparison of defined normal usage patterns of sys-
tem resources with those levels which are currently ob-
served. This method did not eventually prove effective
against more intelligent attackers of the system.
From the work of [Denning, 1987], a statistical intru-
sion detection model was introduced and became a land-
mark for research in this area. The model was based
on computer system keystroke dynamics and which now
forms the core of most intrusion detection methodologies
in use today. The concept involves the development of
an electronic signature of a user based on their individ-
ual typing characteristics but modern-day research has re-
vealed better approaches. The work of [Lunt, 1989] in-
troduced a concept that involved anomaly detection, mis-
use detection and their combined effects and was regarded
more effective than the existing methods until 1994. A
more advanced methodology that involved pattern recog-
nition and network monitoring was introduced in the work
of [Mukherjee et al., 1994]. The pattern recognition con-
cept involved the recording of different penetration sce-
narios and coded into the system in the form of knowledge
representation. The networking monitoring approach in-
volves the use of various network measuring techniques
and is a more advanced method of system intrusion detec-
tions currently in use. Its advantage over the other meth-
ods lies in its independence of network audit data.
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2.3 The application of Artificial Neural Net-
works
The use of artificial neural networks in intrusion detec-
tion emerged from the works of [Fox et al., 1990] and
[Denault et al., 1994]. Various networks were designed
based on the Self-Organizing Feature Map (SOFM) to
learn the characteristics of normal system activity and
identify statistical variations from the norm that may be
an indication of a virus or malicious activity. These meth-
ods were in use until [Ryan et al., 1997] used the back-
propagation algorithm to develop a system called Neu-
ral Network Intrusion Detector (NNID). The network was
designed based also on user recognition and tested on a
system of 10 users. The network was about 85 percent
accurate in detecting malicious activities with about 15
percent false positive detection rate.
The work of [Cannady, 2000] introduced a method for
intrusion detection based on the CMAC-Cerebellar Model
Articulation Controller [Albus, 1975] which uses adaptive
neural networks and the capability to learn new attacks
rapidly through the use of a modified reinforced protected
system. This was a modified reinforcement learning ap-
proach which resulted in an average detection error of 4%
percent, compared to 15% in existing intrusion detection.
A remarkable achievement in intrusion detection was
recorded when malicious shellcode detection approach
was introduced in the work of [Toth and Kruegel, 2002].
Though this approach recorded good success concerning
the identification of shellcode that is an indispensable part
of an attack vector, it was nevertheless limited regarding
the detection of a wider range of polymorphic shellcode
exhibiting self-decrypting behaviour.
In [Aida et al., 2010] a framework using a Multi-Layer
Perceptron was proposed consisting of four phases: col-
lection of intrusion detection parameters; processing of
the filtered parameters; design of the system response
manager; and the learning model. A total of 145,587
normal and attack events were collected, 70% of the data
was used for training while the remaining 30% was used
for testing. Over 90% performance on intrusion detection
was recorded.
2.4 Malicious shellcode detection approach
This is regarded as a viable and potent approach for the
general detection of code injection system of attacks.
It focuses on the recognition of the shellcodes which
are essentially part of an attack vector, this technique
was initially referred to as abstract payload execution
in the work of [Toth and Kruegel, 2002]. According to
[Wang et al., 2006] and [Wang et al., 2008] initially this
approach was implemented as an attempt to identify the
presence of shellcode in network data traffic using static
code analysis. However, methods that are based on static
code analysis cannot handle malicious code effectively
especially if they employ advanced polymorphic tactics
such as self-modications. As a form of improvement
to this approach, dynamic code analysis using emula-
tion which cannot be hindered by such obfuscations and
can detect even extensively polymorphic shellcodes was
introduced in the work of [Polychronakis et al., 2009].
This kind of actual payload execution has proven quite
effective in practice and being used in network-level
and host-level systems for the zero-day detection of
both server-side and client-side code injection attacks
[Egele et al., 2009].
The above techniques have common limitation which
is that they are limited to the detection of certain
class of self-modifying shellcodes which are capable
of exhibiting self-decrypting behaviour. According to
[Polychronakis et al., 2010], to evade signature based de-
tectors shellcode encryption is very often used, that
notwithstanding, attackers can still achieve good level of
evasiveness without the utilization of any self-decrypting
codes and thus rendering the above systems also ineffec-
tive. Besides code encryption, polymorphism can also
be achieved by transforming the actual contents of the
shellcode before initiating the attack – this technique is
commonly referred to as metamorphism. Metamorphism
is widely utilized by several virus programmers and thus
can easily be used for shellcode mutation. The authors in
[Polychronakis et al., 2010] stated surprisingly that even
plain or ordinary shellcodes, which do not mutate across
different platforms, can also evade detection by existing
payload execution methods. They also stated that in prin-
ciple a plain shellcode is no different from any form of
metamorphic shellcode, both neither contain a decryp-
tion property nor exhibit any self-modications or dynamic
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code generation. In effect, an attack that uses unknown
plain shellcodes that are resistant to static analysis could
evade existing detection systems, this was also previously
stated in [Chung et al., 2008].
In [Boxuan et al., 2010] a model was proposed for in-
trusion detection by detecting malicious shellcodes with
virtual memory snapshots. From their proposed model, a
malicious shellcode detection methodology was designed
and implemented. In the method, snapshots of the tar-
get processs virtual memory are taken immediately before
input data are consumed and fed into a lightweight De-
tection Before Consumption (DBC-based) malicious code
detector. These snapshots were also used to instantiate a
runtime environment that emulates the target processs in-
put data consumption. This environment facilitates moni-
toring shellcodes behaviour. The snapshots helped to ex-
amine system calls invoked by executable input data and
the parameters thereof as well as the processs execution
ow to detect malicious shellcodes. This model suffered
set back in its application as a result of significant rate of
false positive detections.
3 Method
3.1 The proposed approach and its signifi-
cance
In order to improve the above existing intrusion detec-
tion techniques, an approach involving the recognition of
shellcode programming patterns in the midst of other net-
work data with the help of artificial neural networks is
proposed and demonstrated in this paper. The detection of
shellcode data within network traffic containing a mixture
of dynamic link libraries (DLL), jpg image files and shell-
code has eluded research thus far with the standard out-
come being large numbers of false positives as described
above.
The stated aim of this research is to be able to accu-
rately recognise those three classes of data (image, DLL
and shellcode) using appropriately designed neural net-
works structures with minimum false positives. Thus,
the significance of the proposed approach lies in its abil-
ity to accurately identify shellcode amidst other com-
mon data in computer data traffic with absolutely no case
of false positive detections when applied using the of-
fline detection-before-consumption methodology. Once
the desired performance of the neural network is achieved,
research can progress on further issues such as real-time
detection and optimization to a wide variety of shellcodes.
3.2 Network traffic data collection
As previously alluded, it has been observed in both work-
ing practice and academic research that image files and
benign binaries often cause false positives as shellcode
using current technology signature based intrusion detec-
tion systems. The data collection involved the selection of
100 images, 160 variety of shellcodes and 140 Dynamic-
Link Library (DLL) files which were pseudo-randomised
and transmitted over a network between two machines,
captured and saved as a *.pcap. The exact order in which
data packets were transmitted was noted. At the receiving
endpoint, packet payloads were extracted, structured and
used to train, validate and test the neural networks.
As part of network design procedure, visual data anal-
ysis was performed to get a feel for the structure of the
data. Figure 1 shows 2D plots of each file type as im-
age, shellcode and DLL. For clarity, only the first 1000
elements of 3 files randomly selected from each class are
plotted, padded with zeros where required. The plots were
produced by simply converting each byte of data to its
decimal equivalent. It can be noted that the three classes
of files are rather distinct and, in the case of the images
shown, each class can be uniquely identified by visual in-
spection. We plotted 65% of all data for each class and
verified that the data display similar characteristics. These
observed pattern variations are used as the core enhancer
of the network performance in the classification task.
It is significant to note that a simple conversion from
byte to decimal equivalent defines the required pre-
processing of data; no other feature extraction, statistical
measures, data transformation or corrections are neces-
sary. The data can be used as is raising the possibility of
a resulting neural network suitable for real-time applica-
tions with raw computer network payload input. Figure 2
depicts the pattern variations from a 3D view of 9 files
where 1,000 points are plotted for each: on the horizontal
axis, the first 3 files are images, the next 3 are shellcode
and the last 3 are DLLs.
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3.3 Neural network input and output data
structure
All 400 collected samples (100 images, 160 shellcodes
and 140 DLLs) were read into Matlab workspace as a col-
umn vector of its corresponding pure decimal values. The
first 100 elements of each sample were selected and as-
signed to a variable DATA, forming a 400 × 100 matrix.
70% of the 400 columns were evenly selected and ran-
domised as training data while the remaining 30 percent
were retained for testing the generalising power of the net-
work after training. The selection of data into training set
and test set was performed using the Matlab code below:
A=DATA(:,1:10:end); B=DATA(:,2:10:end);
C=DATA(:,3:10:end); D=DATA(:,4:10:end);
E=DATA(:,5:10:end); F=DATA(:,6:10:end);
G=DATA(:,7:10:end); H=DATA(:,8:10:end);
I=DATA(:,9:10:end); J=DATA(:,10:10:end);
P = [A B C D E F G]; %280 training patterns
TP = [H I J]; %120 test patterns
This means that for all groups A--J the following
ground truth for output classes apply: Image: vectors 1–
10 Shellcode: vectors 11–26 DLL: vectors 27–40. The
expected neural network outputs were structured as shown
below in Table 1.
Table 1: Network output structure
Output Nodes Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
(Image) (Shellcode) (DLL)
Node 1 1 0 0
Node 2 0 1 0
Node 3 0 0 1
Ground Truth
Vectors in A--J 1–10 11–26 27–40
The expected outputs (targets) were designed and se-
lected evenly and correspondingly with the patterns using
the Matlab code below:
%Only one node go high per class:
T1=[1;0;0]; T2=[0;1;0]; T3=[0;0;1];
Target=[repmat(T1,1,100),repmat(T2,1,160)
, repmat(T3,1,140)];
%Define targets for A--J:
AA=Target(:,1:10:end); BB=Target(:,2:10:end);
CC=Target(:,3:10:end); DD=Target(:,4:10:end);
EE=Target(:,5:10:end); FF=Target(:,6:10:end);
GG=Target(:,7:10:end); HH=Target(:,8:10:end);
II=Target(:,9:10:end); JJ=Target(:,10:10:end);
T=[AA BB CC DD EE FF GG]; %Training target
TT=[HH II JJ]; %Test target for statistical purposes
4 NETWORK DESIGN, TRAIN-
ING AND SIMULATION RE-
SULTS
4.1 Network design
To design or create a feed-forward back-propagation net-
work in Matlab, the function used is newff whose syntax
is net = newff(P,T,S,TFi,BTF) with input parame-
ters as follows:
• P is a matrix RxQwhere R is the number of inputs and
Q equals 2, representing a 2-element row vector of
the minimum and maximum values in the inputs. For
example, for Q = [0 255], P=[0 255;0 255;0
255] which is a 3× 2 matrix describing the number
of network inputs. Q is calculated by the minmax
built-in function;
• T is a matrix of KxN where K is a column vec-
tor describing the number of output nodes and N
is the number of patterns. For a successful de-
sign, every node must switch values between high
1 and low 0 for classification. Therefore, for input
patterns with 3 nodes (representing shellcode, im-
age, and DLL) class 1 is represented with a target
T1=[1;0;0], class 2 with T2=[0;1;0] and class 3
with T3=[0;0;1];
• S is the size of the hidden layers (the output layer
size is determined from T);
• TFi is the transfer function of ith hidden layer. The
transfer functions tansig was used for a single hid-
den layer network while tansig and logsig were
used for a 2 hidden layer network. For the output
layer, purelin is used; and
• BTF is the back-propagation network training func-
tion, both trainlm and trainscg were used.
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The definitions of the functions used in the design are
as follows. The log-sigmoid (logsig) transfer function
with outputs between {0, 1} as the network input goes
from negative infinity to positive infinity:
f(x) = (1 + exp−βx)−1 (1)
The hyperbolic tangent sigmoid (tansig) transfer func-
tion with outputs between {−1, 1} as the network input
goes from negative infinity to positive infinity:
f(x) = 2(1 + exp−2x)−1 − 1 (2)
And the linear (purelinear) transfer function in which
output neurons can take any value and are not limited to a
small range:
f(x) = mx+ b (3)
The training algorithms used were the Reduced Mem-
ory Levenberg-Marquardt (trainlm) which requires the
storage of some large matrices for training, but in general
the algorithm will have the fastest convergence. Further-
more, trainlm also yields the lower mean square errors
than most learning algorithms. An alternative algorithm
was also tested namely the trainscg or scaled conju-
gate gradient algorithm. The algorithm performs well
on a large variety of problems with reduced memory re-
quirements especially on networks with large number of
weights.
A large number of possible designs can be realised.
For instance, using a network design with the input vector
fixed to 100, one hidden layer of 10 nodes and one output
layer with 3 nodes, we can permute the transfer functions
and learning algorithms as follows:
NET1=newff(repmat(minmax,100,1), [10 3],{tansig ’pure-
lin’}, trainlm);
NET2=newff(repmat(minmax,100,1), [10 3],{logsig ’purelin’},
trainlm);
NET3=newff(repmat(minmax,100,1), [10 3],{tansig ’purelin’},
trainscg);
NET4=newff(repmat(minmax,100,1), [10 3],{logsig ’purelin’},
trainscg);
By the same token, alternative designs can be obtained
by changing the size of input vector, number of hidden
layers, and the number of nodes in each layer.
4.2 Network training and testing
The network configurations above were trained using the
Matlab function train as: NET = train(NET,P,T);
where P and T are the structured patterns and targets re-
spectively. A neural network can be trained several times
in order to improve its performance. After training, if the
network has not converged, it can be trained again car-
rying on from the last weight values. It is possible also
to start training afresh, in that case the (init) initializa-
tion command must be executed before each new train
command. The (init) command ensures that the net-
work is initialised with new connection weights and bi-
ases to be updated accordingly as training progresses. As
a result, the network performance consistently varies for
every training command executed. These variations do
not necessarily translate to better performance and so at
the end of every training, it is required to evaluate per-
formance and a decision be made on possible parameter
alteration towards performance improvement.
The networks were simulated with unseen data using
the function sim with the corresponding reserved test
data as Y=sim(NET,PT) where Y is the network outputs
and PT the unseen patterns. The number unseen patterns
clearly classified was used to determine the network per-
formance. Out of the 120 test vectors reserved, some sam-
ple results are illustrated in Tables 2, 3, and 4 for network
NET4 above where results for image are highlighted in
green and shellcode in red:
From Table 2 columns 1, 5 and 8 are clearly classi-
fied as images (expected result as [1 0 0]T ) where the
quoted results of 0.99 are interpreted as 1 while 0.01 as
zero; columns 2, 3, 6 and 9 classified as shellcodes (ex-
pected [0 1 0]T ); columns 4, 7 and 10 as DLLs (expected
[0 0 1]T ). All results match their respective set targets.
From Table 3 columns 1 and 4 are classified as images
(expected [1 0 0]T ); columns 2, 5, 8 and 9 are classified as
shellcodes (expected [0 1 0]T ); columns 3, 6, 7 and 10 as
DLLs (expected [0 0 1]T ). These results also match their
set targets. From Table 4 columns 1, 4 and 7 are classi-
fied as images (expected [1 0 0]T ); columns 2, 5 and 8 are
classified as shellcodes (expected [0 1 0]T ); columns 3, 6,
9 and 10 as DLLs (expected [0 0 1]T ). These also match
their set targets for each category. It is important to stress
here the actual level of confidence in the results, as error
is within 0.01 which means that outputs equal or greater
6
Table 2: 1st Sample Test Data as TP(:,1:13:end) where green: image, red: shellcode, black: DLL
Output Nodes Sample results for 10 test vectors
Node 1 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.99 0.00 0.01
Node 2 0.00 0.99 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.99 0.00
Node 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.99
Table 3: 2nd Sample Test Data as TP(:,2:13:end) where green: image, red: shellcode, black: DLL
Output Nodes Sample results for 10 test vectors
Node 1 0.99 0.01 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Node 2 0.01 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.99 0.00
Node 3 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.99 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.99
than 0.99 are rounded off to 1 and equal or smaller than
0.01 are rounded off to zero.
Table 5 summarises the obtained classification results
with high accuracy and high precision as one of images,
shellcodes and DLLs without any false positives or false
negatives.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper represents a step improvement in shellcode
recognition from raw network traffic. The approach to
convert bytes to their decimal equivalent independent of
their true data type constitutes a simple pre-processing
scheme. Also, by selecting only the first 100 samples
from each datapacket from data streams leads to a design
that is highly accurate with high precision. A number of
designs were tested and the most appropriate design was
a back propagation network with Levenberg-Marquardt
learning algorithm applied to a network with 100 input
nodes, a hidden layer of 10 nodes and an output layer with
3 nodes with respective transfer functions of logsig and
purelin.
Although this approach holds high promise in intrusion
detection applications, it is important to stress a few lim-
itations of the current design for real-time applications as
follows:
• Raw network traffic data need to be structured into
predetermined block size to fit the neural network in-
put data size: neural networks are trained with spe-
cific input data sizes and they cannot be simulated
with data size different from the network input de-
sign. This has been addressed through fixed size
sampling of data packets padded with zeros where
required;
• The developed neural network has not been designed
for online intrusion detection tasks: the design has
not been optimised for integration with live network
data traffic as the purpose is to demonstrate its abil-
ity to recognise shellcode that is randomly present in
network data;
• It requires the collection of computer network data
using data traffic capture for offline analysis: due to
the current inability of the trained network to be in-
tegrated with a live streaming network traffic, mali-
cious detection in this reported research is achieved
through neural network simulation with collected or
captured data;
• The approach does not differentiate good shellcodes
from the bad (malicious) ones; all shellcodes are
flagged in the same way in the reported studies.
Due to the severity of the attack, detecting unauthorized
shell access is the one of the principal goals of network in-
trusion detection, and obtaining shell access the primary
objective of an attacker. Industry experience working
on network traffic analysis with The Shop Direct Group
(UK) Ltd, while processing terabytes of network traffic
per minute, has shown that dynamic link libraries (DLLs)
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Table 4: 3rd Sample Test Data as TP(:,3:13:end) where green: image, red: shellcode, black: DLL
Output Nodes Sample results for 10 test vectors
Node 1 0.99 0.01 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.01 0.01
Node 2 0.01 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.99 0.00 0.00
Node 3 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Table 5: Results Summary
Total Data Collected Training Test Classified Percentage
Patterns Patterns Test Patterns Accuracy
400 280 120 120 100
which are often downloaded as part of system upgrades,
along with image files are the core causes of false posi-
tives with traditional shellcode signatures. Removing the
false positive problem with shellcode detection is one of
the primary objectives in the research area and, prior to
this work, being able to do this both effectively and eco-
nomically has largely proved elusive. Thus, being able to
classify shellcode with the level of accuracy and prevision
discussed here offers a significant move forward in resolv-
ing the issues with shellcode detection. Current and future
work include re-training and testing the network ability to
recognise the various types of shellcode and thus, be able
to pinpoint malicious code. We plan even more extensive
and vigorous false positive testing against very large and
sector diverse benign traffic sets. Also, we are investigat-
ing a design in which our trained network can be actually
used and benchmarked for real time applications using
streamed network traffic. Success in these areas would
lead to further investigations into improving the hardware
to allow for scalability with very high speed networks, for
example use of Field Programmable Gateway Arrays and
Application Specific Integrated Circuits. We also envis-
age investigations into using the same methods to detect
other elements indicative of an attempted system breach
e.g. heap and stack based buffer overflow attacks.
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Figure 1: Example plot of 1,000 data points of collected
data (padded with zeros where required). Top: a jpeg im-
age, middle: a shellcode, bottom: a DLL.
Figure 2: 3D view of 1,000 data points showing differ-
ences between classes (files 1–3: image; files 4–6: shell-
code; files 7–9: DLL)
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